Crypto Deprecation Lint - RSA/ECC inventory for post-quantum (2030/2035)

For security teams: NIST deprecates RSA and ECC signatures and key exchange after 2030 and disallows them after 2035.

Your AI assistant writes rsa.generate_private_key(key_size=2048) and it passes review, because it is correct code. It is also on a clock. NIST IR 8547 puts RSA-2048, ECDSA, EdDSA and finite-field Diffie-Hellman in the deprecated after 2030-12-31, disallowed after 2035-12-31 bucket, and FIPS 203 / 204 / 205 (ML-KEM, ML-DSA, SLH-DSA) were published on 2024-08-13 — the replacements already exist. Since 2026-06-24 the clock also has a US federal schedule: OMB M-26-15 tells agencies to align with IR 8547, move key establishment for high-value systems to PQC during 2028-2030 and signatures in 2031. This extension reads the file you have open and tells you, per line, which clock each algorithm is on and where that clock stands on a date you choose.

It also catches the part that is not a 2030 problem at all. On a 20-line provisioning script of the kind an assistant writes (RSA keys, a P-256 device key, an RS256 JWT, an sshd and an nginx snippet), 15 findings come back on 2026-09-23, and 4 of them are errors today — RSA-1024, PKCS#1 v1.5 padding, MD5, and an ssh_host_dsa_key that OpenSSH 10.0 no longer loads.

New in 1.1.0 (2026-09-23): OpenSSH 10.0 DSA removal (ssh-dss, id_dsa), AES-ECB (NIST SP 800-131A Rev. 3 draft), the OpenSSH 10.0 default mlkem768x25519-sha256 in the SSH KEX check, and the OMB M-26-15 dates on the key-agreement, signature and TLS checks.

What it checks — 19 rules

Each finding carries the line number, the standard it comes from (NIST IR 8547, SP 800-131A Rev. 2 and the Rev. 3 draft, FIPS 186-5, FIPS 203/204/205, NSA CNSA 2.0, OMB M-26-15, OpenSSH 10.0), and the concrete replacement — not "consider migrating", but X25519MLKEM768, mlkem768x25519-sha256, ML-DSA-65.

The date is an input, not a decoration

Set the date and the answer changes, because the standard changes. On the same 20-line script:

• 2026-09-23 — 15 findings, 4 errors. RSA key generation reads "deprecated after 2030-12-31 — 1560 days from 2026-09-23".
• 2031-03-01 — 15 findings, 13 errors. The same line now reads "deprecated since 2030-12-31, disallowed after 2035-12-31".
• 2036-01-15 — "disallowed since 2035-12-31 — not a plan any more, a finding".

That is the number you actually need in a migration plan: not "RSA is bad", but how many working days are left before the algorithm in front of you stops being acceptable.

Commands

• PQC Lint: Check this file — free, unlimited, any use.
• PQC Lint: Sweep workspace and write report (licence) — walks every matching file and writes pqcLint-report.md next to your project.
• PQC Lint: Enter licence key

Free and paid

Free finishes a job on its own: open a file, run the check, see every quantum-vulnerable algorithm in it with line numbers and dates. There is no watermark, no trial counter and no withheld answer.

The paid part is a different axis — scope and ownership. The workspace sweep crosses every file at once and writes a dated report file you keep: the artifact you paste into a customer security questionnaire, attach to a migration ticket, or diff next quarter. $29 once, one licence key per person or CI seat. Get the full version

Yardstick: a security consultant doing the same cryptographic inventory by hand bills $150–$250 an hour, and the first pass over one repository is a day.

Free web version

The same engine, byte for byte, runs in your browser with nothing uploaded: https://getreadystack.com/tools/pqc-deprecation-lint

Notes

Results are advisory and are not legal or certification advice. The rule set is regex-based and deliberately noisy on the side of showing you the line: a linter that silently skips your hashlib.md5 cache key is worse than one that asks you to label it.